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The High-level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change'
was established by the Secretary-General and consisted of sixteen
members serving in their individual capacity; they did not represent
governments. The chapter of the Report which is of relevance to our
subject is entitled "Nuclear, Radiological, Chemical and Biological
Weapons" 2 which included some seventeen recommendations. This
Report, together with the "In Larger Freedom" report of the Secretary-
General,3 formed the basis for the debate by the Heads of State and
Government at the World Summit held in the U.N. General Assembly
in 2005. The summit resulted in the adoption, without objection, of
* This essay is based on the edited transcript of a speech given at California
Western School of Law (CWSL) on February 27, 2007. It was delivered as part of
the University of California, San Diego Institute of International and Comparative
Studies and CWSL Speaker Series addressing the High-level Panel Report on
Threats, Challenges and Change. Larry Johnson first joined the United Nations
Secretariat in 1971 and currently serves as the Assistant-Secretary for Legal Affairs.
He formerly served as the Legal Advisor of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(1997-2001) and Chef de Cabinet, Office of the President of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (2003-2005). The views expressed in
this essay are solely those of the author and do not purport to represent the views of
the United Nations or of the Office of Legal Affairs of the U.N. Secretariat.
1. The Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility:
Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004)
[hereinafter A More Secure World], available at http://www.un.org/
secureworld/report.pdf.
2. Id. [ 107-144.
3. The Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security
and Human Rights for All, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005
(Mar. 21, 2005).
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Assembly Resolution 60/1, known as the "World Summit Outcome
Document.",4  That document contained nothing-nothing-about
nuclear, radiological, chemical, or biological weapons, a fact that was
the issue covered by that chapter of the High-level Panel Report. This
was, of course, criticized and lamented by many commentators and
diplomats, including the then-Secretary-General.
What happened? It is not possible to know for sure, but as we go
through the challenges posed by this subject, it might be that the
various sides in the debate took a "package deal" approach, rather than
a "lowest common denominator" approach. Hence, the various
contending sides blocked each other from adopting what might have
been otherwise generally acceptable recommendations.
Before we examine those recommendations, let us look at the
weapons of mass destruction we are talking about. Their definitions
can be found in the three international treaties that I am about to
describe, but perhaps it is more effective to examine what these
weapons do. I draw from a publication entitled "Weapons of Terror:
Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms" issued
by the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission set up by the
Swedish Government and headed by Dr. Hans Blix, former Director
General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), former
head of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection
Commission in Iraq (UNMOVIC), and a lawyer as well. 5
For nuclear weapons, the Blix Commission simply stated that
such weapons "kill by the effects of heat, blast, radiation and
radioactive fallout" 6 and noted that the attacks on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki killed an estimated 200,000 people, virtually all civilians.7
Finally, it noted that the "nuclear weapons in one strategic submarine
have a combined explosive force several times greater than all the
conventional bombs dropped in World War 11.,,8
4. 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, G.A. Res. 60/1, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005).
5. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION COMM'N, WEAPONS OF TERROR: FREEING
THE WORLD OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL ARMS (2006), available at
http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/Weapons-of-Terror.pdf.
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As to biological and toxin weapons, the Blix Commission said the
following:
[They] kill by using pathogens to attack cells and organs in human
bodies, although they can be used to target crops and livestock on a
massive scale. Some are contagious and can spread rapidly in a
population, while others, including anthrax and ricin, infect and kill
only those who are directly exposed. 9
Chemical weapons, according to the Blix Commission "kill by
attacking the nervous system and lungs, or by interfering with a
body's ability to absorb oxygen. Some are designed to incapacitate by
producing severe burns and blisters."'°
Weapons of terror indeed they are. What is the law on this?
Recall that the U.N. Charter was drafted and adopted in the
summer of 1945, before the first atomic bombs were dropped in
August of that year. The Charter does not refer to nuclear weapons or
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). But, the Charter does authorize
the General Assembly to consider the principles governing
disarmament and the regulation of armaments and to make
recommendations to the Member States or to the Security Council or
both." Furthermore, the Security Council "shall be responsible" for
formulating plans to be submitted to member states "for the
establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments."' 2 The
Security Council clearly has a mandate in this area.
The international law regimes dealing with the three types of
WMD are governed by the following three international treaties, all of
which are treaties ratified by the United States and thus binding in our
law (the year indicated being the year of entry into force):




11. U.N. Charter art. 11, para. 1.
12. Id. art. 26.
13. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature
July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT].
2007]
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b) The 1975 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)
and Toxin Weapons (BTWC);I4 and
c) The 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and
on their Destruction (CWC). 15
Each of these three treaties aims for universal participation.
Weapons control regimes work best if all states adhere to them. There
are 190 parties to the NPT; 16 significantly, India, Israel, and Pakistan
were never parties, and North Korea has announced its withdrawal.'
7
For the BTWC, the number of parties is around 155, and for CWC
around 180.
Let us examine the similarities of the three Conventions:
a) They all deal not only with the weapon itself, but also with
the equipment or materials needed to build it;
b) While the verification regimes differ widely, the ultimate
body responsible for deciding what to do in case of non-
compliance is the Security Council of the United Nations.
c) All three share the same sort of withdrawal provision found
in numerous arms control treaties: if a state party decides that
extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the
treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country,
it may withdraw from the treaty upon issuing a statement of
those extraordinary events and informing the other states
parties and the Security Council. Often referred to as the
"Achilles' heel" of arms control treaties, this provision has
been invoked twice by North Korea to purport to get out of
14. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter BTWC].
15. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for signature Jan.
13, 1993, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-21, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter CWC].
16. U.N. Office for Disarmament Affairs, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), http://disarmainent2.un.org/wmd/npt/index.html (last
visited Oct. 6, 2007).
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its NPT treaty obligations.' 8 Interestingly, neither the United
States nor the United Kingdom, I understand, have accepted
North Korean pronouncements as being in conformity with
the withdrawal clause.
As to key differences:
a) Banning the weapon. The BTWC and the CWC completely
prohibit making the weapon-no development, production,
or stockpiling (The CWC also prohibits the use of the
weapon.) The NPT includes a similar prohibition on making
or possessing the weapon but only for "non-nuclear weapon
states" (NNWS), which are defined as any state party other
than China, France, the Russian Federation, the United
Kingdom, and the United States (NWS). Thus, two
categories are established: the five nuclear weapon states,
which just happen to also be the five permanent members of
the Security Council, and everyone else. In exchange for
agreeing to forgo the development of nuclear weapons, the
NNWS were promised access to nuclear technology for
peaceful purposes, either through developing their own
capacity or through import, but always under an IAEA
inspection regime. In addition, all parties including the NWS
undertook to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an
early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control."' 9 For international lawyers, it is of
interest to note that the International Court of Justice was
called upon to give advice on whether the use or threat of use
(not mere possession) of nuclear weapons per se violates
international law.20 A majority concluded that, in general,
customary international law would be violated as such
weapons are, by definition, indiscriminate and civilians
would inevitably suffer particularly cruel effects. 2' However,
18. Id.
19. NPT, supra note 13, art. VI.
20. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, 228 (July 8).
21. Id. at 257-59, 266.
20071
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the court divided evenly on whether the use of such weapons
would be contrary to law in the "extreme circumstance of
self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at
stake., 22 The president of the court cast his deciding vote for
the proposition that it was not possible under current
international law to reach a conclusion on that point.23
b) The inspection regime. For the NPT, no inspection regime
was established in the Treaty itself. Rather, this function was
"contracted out" to the IAEA,24 which had been established
some ten years before and had developed a voluntary,
safeguards system to monitor the uses of nuclear energy to
verify the peaceful, "non-military nature" of such activities.
Thus, NNWS under the NPT are required to conclude
bilateral "safeguards" agreements with the IAEA to govern
the inspections regime to oversee the peaceful nuclear
activities of such states. The regime was designed to verify
that nuclear material was not diverted from peaceful purposes
to prohibited uses (that it was always accounted for-nothing
missing) and to give assurances that there were no
undeclared (clandestine) nuclear activities which were thus
not being inspected. If there is a finding by the IAEA of non-
compliance, the matter is sent to the General Assembly and
the Security Council. For BTCW, there is no verification
regime at all. If a state party has a complaint regarding non-
compliance, it simply goes to the Security Council. Several
attempts have been made to establish a verification regime,
but these have failed. Perhaps it would involve too intrusive
a regime over a significant portion of the industry that uses
material suitable for either totally benign or weapon
purposes. For CWC, a sophisticated inspection regime exists
involving inspections of the destruction of the weapon within
a given time frame. Challenge inspections are possible by a
state party and again, it is the Security Council which is
involved in claims of non-compliance.
22. Id. at 266.
23. Id.
24. See NPT, supra note 13, art. III, para. 1.
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How has this system worked? The BTWC and CWC regimes
have not had complaints of non-compliance so there is little history to
guide us on the extent of compliance with their basic legal obligations.
For the NPT, it is quite a different story. In the case of North Korea,
the system worked in the sense that IAEA inspectors found anomalies
in the information provided by the government and in their own
technical findings; they needed clarification because the findings
indicated more was going on in the nuclear field than declared by the
government. This sparked the first North Korean withdrawal from the
NPT. Even with its return for a time, the discrepancies were never
resolved and the IAEA continued to insist on the required
clarifications. The second withdrawal came about because of U.S.
allegations of clandestine nuclear activities. In the case of Iraq, after
the first Gulf War, it was discovered that Saddam Hussein had set up a
considerable secret infrastructure to plan and develop nuclear
weapons. Inspectors before the war did not have the legal authority to
inspect outside certain parameters. The IAEA fixed this by devising
an "additional protocol" to the normal safeguards agreement,
providing for more intrusive inspections and the requirement that
states provide much more information on "dual use" activities and
equipment. 25 But, not all NPT parties have agreed to the Additional
Protocol. I will discuss the case of Iran below.
If the legal/treaty measures do not provide enough regulation of
WMD, what other mechanisms are being used to help protect the
world from these horrific weapons?
a) Export controls. For all three types of weapons, informal
arrangements have been set up by exporting/technology
holding states to coordinate their export controls over goods
and equipment which could be used for the prohibited
purposes. They agree among themselves, outside the regimes
of the treaties, what conditions to impose before exporting
material or equipment that could be diverted from peaceful to
weapon purposes.
25. Int'l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Model Protocol Additional to the
Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the
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b) Initiatives to prevent, interdict, and reduce the demand for
the dangerous or "proliferation sensitive" materials. Several
programs exist along these lines. For example, the United
States has established, with about sixty other countries, the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) designed to interdict
unauthorized shipments or transfers of WMD, missile
systems and related materials.26 The PSI is designed to cover
both state and non-state actors. The Initiative involves
control over U.S. and PSI partners' flagships (including stop,
search, and seizure), ports, and territorial waters. Airplanes,
airports, and airspace are also included.
c) Reducing material. The Global Threat Reduction Initiative is
a U.S. program aimed at reducing and securing high-risk
nuclear and radiological materials and equipment in
cooperation with governments world-wide. 27 It targets, for
example, Russian- and American-originated highly enriched
material or spent fuel, requiring that it be returned for
processing into less-proliferation sensitive material.
d) Make fuel available to NNWS. An initiative by the Director
General of the IAEA and supported by the United States and
Russia, would guarantee a supply of nuclear material for
peaceful purposes so that NNWS could not claim they were
justified in developing enrichment and reprocessing
capabilities (as Iran has done). A "fuel bank" run by the
IAEA or a state at competitive rates would provide a steady
flow of material without the need to construct proliferation-
sensitive facilities.28
e) End production. Cutting off the production of nuclear fissile
material has been the subject of treaty negotiations for some
26. See BUREAU OF NONPROLIFERATION, THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY
INITIATIVE (2005), http://usinfo.state.gov/is/img/assets/4756brochurel.pdf (last
visited Oct. 6, 2007).
27. See ExpectMore.gov, Detailed Information on the Global Threat Reduction
Initiative Program Assessment, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/expectmore/
detailIO003239.2006.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2007) (White House website
providing detailed information on the Global Threat Reduction Initiative Program).
28. Press Release, IAEA, IAEA Seeks Guarantees of Nuclear Fuel, IAEA Doc.
PR2006/15 (Sept. 15, 2006), http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/PressReleases/
2006/prn200615.html. •
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time in Geneva, but they have been stalled over disagreement
about what to do with the existing stockpiles of fissile
material.29
Let me address briefly two issues in the forefront of today's
WMD crises. First, North Korea. Recently, six nations signed an
"initial actions" agreement in Beijing, which, according to the State
Department, "begins to put North Korea back on track to realize the
commitments" of 2005 by which that country agreed to "abandoning
all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an
early date" to the NPT and the IAEA.30  Time will tell how the
implementation of this new agreement proceeds.
Second, Iran. While Iran claims that it has a right to enrich
uranium as part of its peaceful nuclear energy program, the IAEA
Board of Governors found that there had been a history of
concealment and failure to declare certain activities to the agency, and
therefore reported the matter to the Security Council. The Council has
decided that over and above its obligations under NPT and the
safeguards agreement with the IAEA, Iran was required, under
Chapter VII of the Charter, to suspend all proliferation-sensitive
nuclear activities, including all enrichment-related and all
reprocessing activities, as confidence-building measures. 31  The
Council also adopted limited economic sanctions with regard to the
sale or supply of material and equipment that could be of benefit to
Iran's nuclear program.32  As its President has indicated that Iran
29. See Jacquelyn S. Porth, U.S. Urges Negotiations to Ban Material for
Nuclear Bombs, U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE (USINFO), Feb. 8, 2007,
http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2007&m= Feb
ruary&x=20070208173438sjhtrop0. 1509821 (last visited Sept. 9, 2007).
30. North Korea: An Important First Step, U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, Feb. 20,
2007, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/scp/80575.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2007); North
Korea Agrees to Abandon Its Nuclear Weapons Programs, U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE
(USINFO), Sept. 19, 2005, http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive/2005/Sep/19-
210095.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2007).
31. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Demands Iran
Suspend Uranium Enrichment by 31 August, or Face Possible Economic,
Diplomatic Sanctions, U.N. Doc. SC/8792 (July 31, 2006), available at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sc8792.doc.htm.
32. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Imposes Sanctions on
Iran for Failure to Halt Uranium Enrichment, Unanimously Adopting Resolution
1737 (2006), U.N. Doc. SC/8928 (Dec. 23, 2006), available at
2007]
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would not comply, the Council will have to determine what to do
next.
33
Finally, all roads seem to lead back to the Security Council.
Besides the non-compliance provisions of the three treaties, you may
recall that I mentioned several provisions of the Charter, one referring
to the role of the Council. Recently the Council has assumed a more
active role in the area of WMD and terrorism beyond the Charter-
mentioned role of armament regulation. In 2004, the Council adopted
Resolution 1540, by which it affirmed "that proliferation of nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery,
constitutes a threat to international peace and security." 34  Under
Chapter VII, it decided that states shall take certain steps to enforce
effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent
proliferation of WMD, and established a committee to report to the
Council on the implementation of the resolution. While the Security
Council has addressed proliferation of WMD particularly in the
context of non-state actors and terrorism, it has yet to involve itself in
the disarmament field in any significant way.
One reason the High-level Panel Report generated controversy
was that it did not shirk from raising issues over which agreement
would prove difficult. It recommended various seemingly
uncontroversial measures: support for PSI; an increase in the timeline
for reaching the goals of the Nuclear Threat Initiative 35 and for
destroying chemical weapons; support for the Russian/U.S. measures
to reduce the risk of accidental war; and support for periodic
invitations by the Security Council to the heads of the IAEA and
CWC Secretariat to report to the Council on areas of concern as well
as breaches of their conventions. Additionally, the report
recommended a re-start of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and a
http://www.un.orgINews/Press/docs/2006/sc8928.doc.htm.
33. See, e.g., Elaine Sciolino, U.S. and Europe Draft U.N. Resolution on Iran,
N.Y. TIMEs, May 2, 2006, at Al.
34. Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, S.C. Res. 1540, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).
35. See NTI.org, About NTI, http://www.nti.org/b-aboutnti/b_index.html (last
visited Oct. 15, 2007) ("NTI's mission is to strengthen global security by reducing
the risk of use and preventing the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical
weapons. NTI seeks to raise public awareness, serve as a catalyst for new thinking
and take direct action to reduce these threats.").
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Security Council promise of collective action if a nuclear attack or a
threat thereof was directed at NNWS. It also called for a re-start of
negotiations for a verification regime for the BTWC and for making
the Additional Protocol for IAEA safeguards agreements the new
standard for compliance with the NPT. It further called for the
Council to call for immediate verification of the activities of any
country withdrawing from one of the WMD conventions.
The "elephant in the room" may have been the recommendation
that the NWS "must take several steps to restart disarmament,"
including complying with their NPT obligation to "move towards
disarmament and be ready to undertake specific measures in
fulfillment of these commitments. '' 36 Plus, they should reaffirm their
commitment not to use nuclear weapons against NNWS. The U.S.
position is basically that over the years it and Russia have been
reducing their nuclear stockpiles. Just recently the United States
pointed out that it now has the smallest stockpile of nuclear weapons
since the Eisenhower Administration and that they are more efficient,
more secure and modernized.37 For critics of the U.S. position, this
argument is countered by a reference to the quality and deadly force of
the new weapons; they may be fewer in number, but are much greater
in destructive capability-fewer but "leaner and meaner."
Critics such as those on the Blix Commission blame the increased
risk of proliferation and possible transfer of WMD to terrorists on the
fact that the NWS have not taken serious steps toward disarmament.
They contend that as the NPT obligation toward disarmament by the
NWS seems to be a dead letter, other states and non-state actors are
encouraged to forego any obligations they might have regarding
proliferation and to begin the search for WMD as a matter of national
defense and in response to perceived threat from the NWS who do not
take seriously their disarmament obligation. In the critics' view, what
is needed is not more effective WMD, but rather political and
economic incentives and security guarantees.
One reply of the United States has been that the order of who
should start disarming first is wrong. In order to achieve the
36. A More Secure World, supra note 1, 120.
37. USINFO, Nuclear Weapons Still Key to U.S. Security, Energy's Brooks
Says, July 15, 2005, http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-
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elimination of nuclear weapons, according to Christopher Ford, U.S.
Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation in the State
Department, the global environment must make it both possible and
realistic to do so, rather than simply a Utopian dream.38 What is
needed is to eliminate the threat of international terrorism and rogue
operations from such terrorist groups as Al-Qaeda, as well as to move
against emerging regional nuclear arms race dynamics. The security
climate has to improve so that the NWS will feel secure enough that
the risks are worth taking to achieve the goal of nuclear disarmament.
In sum, the High-level Panel recommendations on WMD may not
have been included in the Summit Outcome Document because of
continued severe disagreements over the general and complete
disarmament issue. But, the High-level Panel's Report provides a
useful checklist of measures to reduce the threat of WMD. While not
adopted in 2005, they remain on the table and if a "take small steps
first" negotiating approach is taken, many recommendations might
eventually be adopted. As for the current situation, it is not a
"disaster"-at least not yet. The North Korean agreement gives hope,
and no other states have withdrawn from WMD treaties. The Iranian
situation is troublesome, but Iran does not possess the weapon as yet,
and the Council is engaged in assuming its responsibility. What is
absolutely clear is that the NWS, the permanent members of the
Council, must deal with the perception of their failure to abide by their
NPT commitment to good faith negotiations for a disarmament treaty
under strict and effective international controls. The longer that
perception continues, the more likely the nuclear nonproliferation
regime will be at risk. There will be difficult policy choices ahead;
legal regimes can only take us so far. What is needed is a true
political will among the NWS (which to be effective will have to
include all nuclear weapons powers such as India, Pakistan, and
Israel) to shore up the nonproliferation regime and change the
perception they are defending at all costs their "privileged" position.
The public will have to be heard on this. All of us on this planet
are in need of protection against the hideous effects of these weapons
of terror.
38. Christopher A. Ford, U.S. Special Representative for Nuclear
Nonproliferation, The NPT Review Process and the Future of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Regime, Remarks to the NPT Japan Seminar (Feb. 6, 2007),
available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rmi/80156.htm.
12
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 38, No. 1 [2007], Art. 8
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol38/iss1/8
